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then on the type of society with which the artist may choose to make us sympathize: it is by no means a matter of indifference whether it be of society past, present, or future, and among these various societies whether it be one social group rather than another. Art should choose its society in the mutual interest of æstheticism and ethics. "In conclusion," says Guyau, "art being pre-eminently a social phenomenon, it is certain that it has in itself a social value: in fact, it always tends either to advance or retard the actual society in which it is exercised, in proportion as it makes it sympathize, by means of the imagination, with a better or worse society. In this, for the sociologist, consists the ethics of art, an ethics quite intrinsic and self-contained, which is not the result of calculation, but which springs up apart from calculation or the pursuit of any aim."

Upon the whole, Guyau distinguishes himself from other contemporaneous writers on æsthetics, in basing it, not like Spencer, Sully, Grant Allen, etc., upon the theory of the working of the perceptive and representative faculties (of which the first notion is found in Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason,") but upon the theory of the social sentiments and social feelings; and this new æstheticism is interesting to the moralist because it tends, though by another route, to the same result as the æstheticism of the ancients (that of Plato and Plotinus) to closely unite the beautiful with the good, art with morals.

E. BOIRAC.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BEAUTIFUL, being an Outline of the History of *Æsthetics*. By William Knight, Professor of Philosophy in the University of St. Andrew's. London: John Murray, 1891. Pp. xv., 288.

The Philosophy of the Beautiful has, as Professor Knight remarks in his preface, a most intimate connection with the Philosophy of the Good. He takes as his motto the lines of Tennyson,—

"Beauty, Good, and Knowledge are three sisters
That dote upon each other, friends to man,
Living together under the same roof,
And never can be sundered without tears,"

and he says that "these lines of the chief seer among poets now living, embody the central thought of this book." It must be confessed that the high hopes thus raised are somewhat rudely dashed to the ground when it appears that the book in question is simply a short history of the various theories of æsthetics that have been held from the earliest times till now. He promises, however, that a "constructive theory" is "to follow it by and by." We shall await this constructive theory with great interest. In the mean time there is little to be said but that the sketch of æsthetic theories, within the compass of 282 pages, is wonderfully exhaustive. The chief doubt that occurs to one in reading it is, whether it might not have been more enlightening to deal only with the great writers on the subject, and to trace more fully the lines of development from one to another, and the connection of their æsthetic theories with their views of philosophy generally. It is to be feared that the mass of conflicting doctrines here presented will be somewhat confusing to most of the extension students, for

whose use the book is primarily intended. Also, the distribution of the space allotted to different thinkers is ill balanced; and the summaries of their views are often neither clear nor accurate.

J. S. M.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES: AN INAUGURAL LECTURE. By Andrew Seth, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh: Blackwood & Sons, 1891. Pp. 32.

The inaugural address of the new professor at Edinburgh will naturally attract much attention in philosophical circles. It is, of course, mainly concerned with Logic, Psychology, and Metaphysics; but it is rendered interesting to students of Ethics by the concluding paragraphs, in which Professor Seth indicates his own stand-point. This stand-point, it is perhaps needless to say, is frankly teleological. He sums it up in the following eloquent passage,—“Not to man as a creature specially located on this earth, but to man and all creatures like him who are sharers in the life of thought, and called thereby to be authors of their own perfection—to man as rational all things are relative. To him the creation looks; for him all things are made. This is the imperishable grandeur of Hegel’s system that he has given such sonorous utterance to this view, and expressed it with such magnificent confidence. I cannot always emulate his confidence, nor can I adopt as perfectly satisfactory his universalistic mode of expression. The achievements of the world-spirit do not move me to unqualified admiration, and I cannot accept the abstraction of the race in place of the living children of men. Even if the enormous spiral of human history is destined to wind itself at last to a point which may be called achievement, what, I ask, of the multitudes who perished by the way? These all died, not having received the promises. What if there *are* no promises *to them*? To me the old idea of the world as the training-ground of individual character seems to offer a much more human, and, I will add, a much more divine, solution than this pitiless procession of the car of progress. Happily, however, the one view does not necessarily exclude the other; we may believe in the progress of the race and yet believe in the future of the individual. Nature’s profusion and nature’s work will doubtless be urged against us when we plead for the rights of the individual life. But these are objections which every theodicy has to meet. I do not wish to minimize them; on the contrary, they appeal to me with painful force. But the possibility of any theodicy depends on our being able to show that nature and nature’s ways of working are not the last word of creation. Nature is non-moral, indifferent, and pitiless; but man is pitiful, and human nature flowers in love and self-denial, in purity and stainless honor. If these have no root in the nature of things, then, indeed,

‘The pillared firmament is rottenness,
And earth’s base built on stubble’

But we do well, as Goethe teaches in one of his finest poems, to recognize in such attributes of human-kind our nearest glimpse into the nature of the divine. The part is not greater than the whole; and we may rest assured that whatever